

Withdrawn/Redacted Material

The George W. Bush Library

DOCUMENT NO.	FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
001	List	[List]	1	09/15/2003	P5;
002	Email	FW: Urgent Re: UN Cloning Convention - To: BJ Goergen - From: Karl Rove	2	09/14/2004	P5; P6/b6;
003	Handwritten Note	[Note with attachments] - To: Brett Kavanaugh - From: Karl Rove	6	09/08/2003	P5;
004	Letter	[Letter] - To: POTUS	1	09/07/2003	P2; P5; P6/b6;
005	Fax Cover Sheet	[Fax Cover Sheet with attachments] - To: Karl Rove - From: Bob Kjellander	6	09/04/2003	P2; P5; P6/b6;
006	Email	Fw: Thanks! - To: Susan Ralston - From: Karl Rove	2	09/10/2003	PRM;

COLLECTION TITLE:

Records Management, White House Office of

SERIES:

Subject Files - FG006-27 (Office of Senior Advisor - Karl Rove)

FOLDER TITLE:

536138 [2]

FRC ID:

9721

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO.	FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
007	Memorandum	Request for Additional FY 2004 Funding for the War on Terror Outreach - To: Karl Rove - From: Lezlee Westine	1	09/15/2003	P5;
008	Email	FW: Wes Clark - To: Susan Ralston - From: Karl Rove	1	09/15/2003	PRM;
009	Memorandum	Administration Efforts in the Klamath Basin - To: Karl Rove - From: Bill Greene	6	08/20/2003	P5;
010	Fax Cover Sheet	Letters [with attachments] - To: Susan Ralston	3	04/30/2003	P2; P5; P6/b6;
011	Email	FW: FYI - To: Barbara Goergen - From: Tim Goeglein	1	09/15/2003	P5;
012	Email	New American Citizenship Initiative... - To: Karl Rove - From: Peter Wehner	2	04/29/2003	P5; P6/b6;

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013	Memorandum	New American Citizenship Initiative [with attachments] - To: Pete Wehner - From: Jeff Bell	10	04/23/2003	P5;
014	Email	Forced Over the Counter Switches - To: Karl Rove - From: Jay Lefkowitz	2	05/21/2003	P5;
015	Email	Gregg Easterbrook on EPA Report - To: Karl Rove - From: Peter Wehner	1	06/29/2003	P5; P6/b6;
016	Email	Gallup Party Splits - To: Karl Rove - From: Lauren Willson	1	09/22/2003	PRM;
017	Email	Party Splits - To: Karl Rove - From: Lauren Willson	1	09/22/2003	PRM;
018	Email	Fw: Follow Up - To: Susan Ralston - From: Karl Rove	2	06/30/2003	PRM;

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019	Email	Bush Accomplishments - To: Karl Rove - From: Peter Wehner	2	06/29/2003	P5;
020	Draft	War on Terrorism	2	N.D.	P5;

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date: 9/15/03

To: Karl Rove

From: Strategic Initiatives Sean O' Hollaren
OLA

- FYI
- Appropriate Action
- Direct Response
- Prepare Response For My Signature
- Per Our Conversation
- Let's Discuss
- Per Your Request
- Please Return
- Deadline
- Other

Comments: list on left includes
everyone undecided on FCC

make copies +
send to:

Letter Westine
Benny Jackson
+ Mike Meese

Withdrawal Marker

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F: FILIPINO
Veterans

536137



DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
Veterans Benefits Administration
Washington, D.C. 20420

SEP 9 2003

Mr. Resty P. Supnet
Filipino World War II Veterans
Federation of San Diego County
8460 Mira Mesa Blvd.
San Diego, CA 92126

Dear Mr. Supnet:

I have been asked to respond to your recent letter to President George W. Bush regarding legislation for Filipino veterans.

Filipino veterans of World War II made great sacrifices to our nation, and I am pleased to tell you that this Administration supports legislation to improve benefits and health care services to these deserving veterans. Specifically, the Administration supports payment of full service-connected disability compensation rates to former New Philippine Scouts and full dependency and indemnity compensation rates to surviving spouses of all recognized Filipino veteran groups, if the veteran or surviving spouse lives in the U.S. and is either a U.S. citizen or alien admitted for permanent residence. The Administration also supports offering health care on the same basis as for U.S. veterans to New Philippine Scouts, veterans of the Commonwealth Army of the Philippines and recognized guerrilla forces who live in the U.S. legally. We also support the extension of several burial benefits to additional groups of Filipino veterans.

Regarding non-service-connected pension, the limitations on eligibility for United States veterans' benefits based on service in the Philippine military forces were established many years ago in a carefully considered determination of the United States and Philippine governments' respective responsibilities with regard to veterans of these forces. In our view, current law appropriately recognizes our two nations' shared responsibility for the well being of members of the Philippine forces, and the longstanding allocation of those responsibilities should not be disturbed.

I am enclosing a recent VA news release, which describes these matters in more detail. I hope this information is useful, and I thank you for your service to our nation.

Sincerely,


Ronald J. Henke, Director
Compensation and Pension Service

Enclosure

Folder # 238904

WH#311924



**Department of
Veterans Affairs**

Office of Public Affairs
Media Relations

Washington, DC 20420
(202) 273-4000
www.va.gov

News Release

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
June 14, 2002

VA Supports Expanding Benefits for Filipino Veterans

WASHINGTON -- Secretary of Veterans Affairs Anthony J. Principi expressed the Administration's support for improved benefits to Filipino veterans and their survivors in a June 13 hearing before the House Committee on Veterans' Affairs Subcommittee on Health. Legislation is pending in both the House and the Senate to expand benefit eligibility for VA health care, compensation and burial benefits.

"The world is indebted to Filipino veterans for their contribution to the Allied victory in World War II," said Principi. "It was President Bush's leadership that made VA's support for these measures possible. The President promised Philippines President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo last fall a review of services and benefits the United States provides for Filipino veterans, and that review has yielded results."

Principi expressed support for payment of the full service-connected disability compensation rates to former New Philippine Scouts and full compensation rates to surviving spouses of all recognized Filipino veteran groups living in this country. They must be either U.S. citizens or aliens admitted for permanent residence. Currently, the New Philippine Scouts and the survivors receive half of the rate of compensation that American veterans and their survivors receive. The Scouts enlisted or reenlisted in Filipino-manned units of the U.S. Army on or after Oct. 6, 1945.

The Administration also supports offering health care on the same basis as for U.S. veterans to New Philippine Scouts, veterans of the Commonwealth Army of the Philippines and recognized guerrilla forces who live in the U.S. legally. Currently, New Philippine Scouts are eligible for care in the U.S. on a discretionary basis, if VA resources permit, and only for treatment of service-connected disabilities. The other Filipino veterans groups are eligible for the same care as U.S. veterans receive only if they have service-connected disabilities.

- More -

VA Supports Filipino Veterans 2/2/2

Several burial benefits would be extended to Filipino veterans beyond those now eligible for them. New Philippine Scouts and veterans without service-connected disability ratings residing legally in the U.S. would qualify for burial allowances and plot allowances at the same dollar level as other veterans, burial flags, burial in national cemeteries and provision of government headstones or grave markers.

Principi said he plans to provide assistance of \$500,000 a year to furnish equipment, and to install and maintain it, at the Veterans Memorial Medical Center in Manila, operated by the Philippine government. The funding would be provided under authority the U.S. government has to assist the Philippines in fulfilling its responsibility to provide medical care for Filipino vets who fought with U.S. forces.

The VA secretary noted that the increased payments of compensation and VA's support for expanding health care eligibility would require congressional approval and the implementation cost would have to remain within spending levels of the Administration's 2003 budget.

#

KARL C. ROVE

F: Steve

Hadley

536 177

Add Steve Hadley to call list

Istanbul, summit

9/16

8:35 AM

Albright - x COS

advertising for advance
pass.

Clinton web site

Jim Lee

- Bennett Johnson / Julie Frisley

- Dan Fried

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date 9-10-03

To: Karl Rove
Dina Powell

From: The Staff Secretary

For your information

EXEC. OFC. PRESIDENT
WH STRATEGIC INITIATIVES

2003 SEP 10 AM 11:30

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*add Dana
Powell to call
list.*



Key Staff

THE CENTER
FOR DEMOCRACY

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Information

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Rule of Law

Election
MonitoringLegislative
DevelopmentDialogues &
DelegationsAllen Weinstein
Biographical Information

.....Historian Allen Weinstein is founder, President and CEO of The Center for Democracy. His international awards include the United Nations Peace Medal (1986) for "efforts to promote peace, dialogue and free elections in several critical parts of the world"; The Council of Europe's Silver Medal (twice, in 1990 and 1996), presented by its Parliamentary Assembly, for "outstanding assistance and guidance over many years"; and a 1991 award from the government of President Violeta Chamorro for his efforts on behalf of democratization in Nicaragua. His other awards and fellowships have included two Senior Fulbright Lectureships, an American Council of Learned Societies Fellowship, the Commonwealth Fund Lectureship in U.S. history at the University of London, and a Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (Smithsonian) Fellowship. In 1987 he delivered the Bicentennial Fourth of July Oration at Boston's historic Faneuil Hall.

.....He was University Professor and Professor of History at Boston University from 1985-89, University Professor at Georgetown University from 1981-1984 and, from 1981 to 1983, Executive Editor of *The Washington Quarterly* at Georgetown's Center for Strategic and International Studies. He served as a member of *The Washington Post* editorial staff in 1981. From 1966-81 he was Professor of History at Smith College and Chairman of its American Studies Program. In 1984 he served as President of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions (Santa Barbara) and as editor of *The Center Magazine*. From 1982-84 he directed the research study which led to the creation of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and was Acting President of the Endowment. Weinstein was a founding member of the Board of Directors of the United States Institute of Peace and Chairman of its Education and Training Committee, remaining a Director until 2001. He was an officer of the International Institute of Democracy in Strasbourg from 1989 to 2001.

.....His international public service activities include chairing the Center's election observation delegations in Russia (1991, 1993, 2000), El Salvador (1991), Nicaragua (1989-90, 1996), Panama (1988-89), and The Philippines (1985-6). Weinstein organized a bipartisan group, at the request of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which reported on the preparations for The Philippines' presidential election; later he was a member of the U.S. Observer Delegation, advisor to the Delegation's co-chairmen, and co-author of its final report. In 1983 Weinstein served as Vice-Chairman of the U.S. delegation to the UNESCO-sponsored International Program for the Development of Communication meeting in Tashkent. He was also Coordinator and Vice-Chairman of the U.S. delegation to the 1982 UNESCO World Conference on Culture.

.....Professor Weinstein's books include *The Haunted Wood: Soviet Espionage in America-The Stalin Era* (Random House, 1999); *Perjury: The Hiss-Chambers Case* (Knopf, Vintage paperback; Hutchinsons Ltd.; revised ed., Random House paperback, 1997), which received several citations including an American Book Award nomination; *Freedom and Crisis: An American History* (Random House, 3 eds.); *Between the Wars: American Foreign Policy from Versailles to Pearl Harbor* (Berkley paperback); *Prelude to Populism: Origins of the Silver Issue* (Yale University Press); and among other edited collections, *Conflict in America* (Voice of America); *American Negro Slavery* (4th ed., Oxford University Press); *American Themes: Essays in Historiography* (Oxford); and *Truman and the American Commitment to Israel: A 30th Anniversary Conference* (Hebrew University/Magnes Press). His articles and essays have appeared in a wide range of scholarly and popular publications.

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Fax Cover Sheet	[Fax Cover Sheet with attachments] - To: Karl Rove - From: Bob Kjellander	6	09/04/2003	P2; P5; P6/b6;

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Records Management, White House Office of

SERIES:

Subject Files - FG006-27 (Office of Senior Advisor - Karl Rove)

FOLDER TITLE:

536138 [2]

FRC ID:

9721

OA Num.:

10745

NARA Num.:

10803

FOIA IDs and Segments:

2015-0037-F

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Email	Fw: Thanks! - To: Susan Ralston - From: Karl Rove	2	09/10/2003	PRM;

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Memorandum	Request for Additional FY 2004 Funding for the War on Terror Outreach - To: Karl Rove - From: Lezlee Westine	1	09/15/2003	P5;

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Relative	Victim	Relation	Comment	Source	Date
Ashton, Kathleen	Thomas Ashton	mother	does not feel it is right to accept money	USA Today	07/31/03
Bauer, Ginny	David Bauer	wife	wants tax relief for Sep 11	ABC News	12/06/01
Beamer, Lisa	Todd Beamer	wife	wants congress to pass tax relief bill for Sep 11	ABC News	12/06/01
Bethke, Myrna	Bill Bethke	brother	against fighting afganistan	BC Cycle	09/08/03
Campbell, Kelly	Craig Amundson	brother-in-law	believes that memorial should be open to everyone	AP	09/08/03
Dahl, Sandy	United Airlines Pilot	wife	supports more protection for pilots, perhaps by the pilots themselves	Good Morning America	09/28/01
Debeuneure, Laques	James Debeuneure	son	feels the current investigation is hiding something	The Early Show	07/31/03
Doyle, Bill		father	would like as much acreage untouched as possible	AP	
Farrel, Jennie			see quote area		
Gardner, Anthony	Harvey Gardner	brother			
Goodrich, Donald W.	Peter Goodrich	father	supports public policies that support the prevention of and response to terrorism	Families of September 11th website	06/25/05
Heidenberger, Tom	Mrs Heidenberger	husband	raising money for memorial	CNN Live Sunday	08/10/03
Kleinberg, Mindy	Alan Kleinberg	husband	against current investigation	Truthout.org	06/25/05
Lasar, Rita	Abe Zelmanowitz	brother	against using victims as reasons to goto war, supports policies to prevent terrorism, and also wants accountability, appreciates	Area news	03/02/03
Lemack, Carie	Judy Larocque	daughter	help from attorney general Spencer's office	Families of September 11th website	06/25/05
Lemack, Dannielle	Judy Larocque	son	supports public policies to prevent terrorism, and also want accountability	Families of September 11th website	06/25/05
Lucznikowska, Valerie	Abe Zelmanowitz	aunt	against the use of force	unknown	04/01/03
Marshall, Donn	Shelley Marshall	husband	questions President Bush's actions	AP	unknown
Martello, Sheila	Jimmy Martello	wife	wants tax relief for Sep 11	ABC News	12/06/01
Maurer, Joseph		father	supports to keep the footprints untouched	AP	06/30/03
McIlvaine, Bob	Robert McIlvane	father	against current investigation, coverup	The War Times	06/25/05
Minerbino, Barbara	Mr. Minerbino	wife	happy about services 9-11-2002	Anchorage Daily News	09/10/02
Minetti, Bob	son	son	feels government is stonewalling the victim's families	AP	06/12/02
Punches, Janice	Jack Punches	wife	raising money for memorial		
Push, Stephen	Lisa J. Raines	husband	supports public policies that support the prevention of and response to terrorism	Families of September 11th website	06/25/05
Push, Steve		husband	against, says Bush Admin are using victims as pawns	CNN Wolf Blitzer Reports	02/01/02
Riviera, Nilsa		wife	she was taken care of very well, but is concerned of other families	Mornings with Paula Zahn	12/11/01
Roger, Thomas	Jean Roger	father	supports public policies that support the prevention of and response to terrorism	Families of September 11th website	06/25/05
Salomone, Maryellen	John Salamone	wife	supports public policies that support the prevention of and response to terrorism	Families of September 11th website	06/25/05
Simpson, Diane		wife	against current method of receiving money	CNN Wolf Blitzer Reports	02/04/02
Stern, Nikki	James Potorti	Wife	supports the prevention of terrorism, and also tax relief credits	Families of September 11th website	06/25/05
survivor	Vanessa Mututanont	survivor	supports rebuilding of towers	Sunday Morning, CBS	09/07/03
Whittington, Dr. H G		relative	not interested in funds, believes it is hush money for airline		
Wiener, Robin K.	Jeffery Wiener	sister	supports public policies that support the prevention of and response to terrorism	Families of September 11th website	06/25/05

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Email	FW: Wes Clark - To: Susan Ralston - From: Karl Rove	1	09/15/2003	PRM;

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Administration Efforts in Klamath Basin

- **Klamath Project Water Bank** – Reclamation is providing \$4 million for the Pilot Water Bank Program this year. To pay irrigators to idle some of their cropland or have them use groundwater instead of project water to irrigate crops.
- **Rangeland Trust** – Interior, with support from USDA and EPA, is funding improvements in the quality and quantity of flows into Agency Lake through a pilot project with the Klamath Basin Rangeland Trust (KBRT) to lease water rights from approximately 9,000 acres of irrigated pastureland. The pilot project (which provides the leased water for instream flows and Agency Lake) has been expanded to additional acreage and extended for the 2003 water year.
- **Agency Lake and Wood River Ranches** – Reclamation acquired the 7,159-acre Agency Lake Ranch, adjoining Wood River Ranch, and hopes to use adjacent lands to increase storage. Such additional storage could help supplement and stabilize Klamath River flows.
- **UKL Sediment Oxygen Demand** – USGS, in cooperation with the Bureau of Reclamation and in consultation with Oregon Department of Environmental Quality, will be measuring sediment oxygen demand in the Klamath River just below Upper Klamath Lake. This stretch of the Klamath River is in violation of State water-quality standards for dissolved oxygen and represents a risk to endangered suckers.
- **Wood River Wetland Management** - USGS began working with BLM in 2003 on an investigation of how best to reincorporate former wetlands back into the Upper Klamath Lake system.
- **Road Treatments** - To improve riparian areas, fish passage, and water quality, BLM has reduced miles of road in the upper Klamath basin. Additional cooperative projects to remove, improve, and close roads have occurred on private land. In the Klamath, Six Rivers, and Shasta Trinity National Forests, the U.S. Forest Service is conducting assessments and analyses and making environmental improvement to its road systems, decommissioning roads and storm-proofing roads at stream crossings. The Karuk Tribe has participated in the decommissioning of Steinicher Road, a forest road that was damaged by fill failure.
- **Juniper Management Treatments** - BLM has completed more than 9,000 acres of juniper treatments to recover herbaceous plant communities that were degraded by juniper encroachment, increasing water availability for nearby shrubs and grasses, possibly improving stream flow and water yield.
- **Range Management** - BLM has completed 27 Rangeland Health Standards Assessments (65 percent, or 133,877 acres of approximately 208,000 acres grazed). Management changes include grazing rotation, additional riparian fencing, and increased use supervision and monitoring.

- **Riparian Restoration** - In addition to riparian restoration accomplishments in Wood River valley, BLM has an ongoing riparian restoration program of shading, stream bank stability, and nutrient and sediment capture and road treatments to improve water quality.
- **Prescribed Fire Management** - BLM has completed over 31,000 acres of prescribed burns. These prescribed fires benefit water quality, streamflow, and understory vegetation conditions as they reduce the risk of catastrophic wildfire.
- **Forest Management** - BLM has treated 10,890 acres, making them more resistant to insects and disease and less susceptible to catastrophic wildfires.
- **Salmon Recovery** - Programs and forums intended to improve conditions for Klamath River salmon have been initiated throughout the watershed. Key processes driven by federal government involvement include:
 - Trinity River Restoration Program
 - Coho Salmon Recovery Planning
 - Pacific Fishery Management Council
 - Klamath Fishery Management Council
 - Steelhead Restoration and Monitoring Program
- A special recovery team has been formed within the Scott and Shasta Rivers, tributaries to the Klamath River, made up mostly of local landowners and state and federal representatives to address impacts associated with agricultural issues in these two sub-basins.
- NOAA administers several grant programs to support restoration efforts in the Klamath River basin. In FY 2000-2002, NOAA Fisheries issued relatively large grants to the States of California and Oregon, and Klamath basin tribes (Yurok, Karuk, Hoopa and Klamath), through the Pacific Coastal Salmon Recovery Fund (PCSRF) for the purposes of restoring coastal salmonid habitat. Over this period, NOAA Fisheries issued grants of \$41.1 million to California, \$41.1 million to Oregon and nearly \$3 million to Klamath basin tribes. NOAA's FY 2003 appropriation includes \$14 million for each of California and Oregon's portion of the PCSRF funds. In 2001 and 2002, over \$8 million in federal funds were allocated through this grant process to projects in the Klamath River basin. These projects include a wide range of activities from conservation easements; road inventory and restoration; fish passage improvements; public outreach; watershed planning, sediment source inventory and stabilization; fencing of riparian areas along streams; and species and habitat monitoring.
- In addition, NOAA Fisheries provided grants to the Yurok Tribe in the late 1990's to investigate the impact of sea lion predation on salmon and steelhead populations in the lower Klamath Basin. The USGS is also working with the Yurok Tribe to assess

the bioenergetics of juvenile Chinook salmon in the Klamath River Estuary. A model is being developed that can be used to estimate the response of salmon to habitat conditions in the estuary.

- **Sucker Recovery Action and Fish Screens** – Reclamation has spent over \$20 million on endangered sucker related recovery actions including spawning enhancement, fish screens and acquisition of Agency Lake Ranch. The A-Canal fish screen will be completed at a cost of about \$15 million. Reclamation also installed fish screens at Agency Lake Ranch and Clear Lake. The 7,159 acre Agency Lake Ranch was purchased for \$5 million in 1998 as off-stream storage for overall Project purposes, including environmental protection.
- **Klamath Basin Fish Screen and Passage Program Investigations Study Report** - was completed in 2003 to assess future screen and passage priorities. Reclamation established a Fish Entrainment and Passage Working Group in 2002 to coordinate with other agencies.
- **Chiloquin Dam** - The Chiloquin Dam Passage Feasibility Study Act provided authority to conduct a study of the feasibility of providing adequate upstream and downstream passage for fish at the Chiloquin Dam including review of all alternatives for providing passage, determination of the most appropriate alternative and development of recommendations for implementing that alternative.

Ecosystem Restoration

- USFWS field office restoration projects included activities such as stream narrowing, streambank stabilization, and fencing cattle out of riparian zones. These projects are funded through the "Partners for Fish and Wildlife," "Jobs-in-the-Woods," and the coastal programs of USFWS.
- In the Upper Klamath Basin, Reclamation has funded 69 projects at a cost of \$1.8 million. Reclamation projects included riparian fencing, marsh restoration, erosion control, stream restoration, fish screens, restoration assessments and design, ground water studies, juniper removal, environmental education, and species monitoring.
- The BIA has funded seven watershed restoration projects on the Hoopa Valley Reservation at a cost of \$1.7 million. The BIA funded five watershed projects on Karuk Tribal ancestral lands at a cost of \$700,000 and provided another 14 watershed restoration projects at a cost of \$1.7 million on the Yurok Reservation. Also, Reclamation has provided \$12 Million to the Hoopa Valley Tribe for habitat restoration activities in the Trinity River Basin.
- In 2003, Reclamation anticipates that it will provide the Yurok Tribe approximately \$850,000 for a study of thermal refugia use by adult spring chinook salmon, radio tracking of yearling released coho salmon and steelhead, a survey of the mainstem

Trinity River to document annual spring and fall-run Chinook salmon, and monitoring of Green sturgeon habitat utilization, among other projects.

Research, Monitoring, and Assessment

- **Upper Klamath Groundwater Study** - The USGS in coordination with the Oregon Water Resources Department (OWRD) and Reclamation is conducting a study to be completed in FY 2005 to quantify the groundwater resources of the upper Klamath Basin. The study will help resource managers safely use groundwater to increase Klamath Basin water supplies by identifying appropriate pumping rates, ideal pumping locations, effective monitoring methods, and improving annual water supply forecasts.
- **Agricultural Runoff** - The USGS is monitoring temperature, dissolved oxygen, and other water quality factors related to fish habitat in the Lower Klamath Basin, and in the Tule Lake/Lower Klamath Lake areas. This work will assist California State agencies in meeting Clean Water Act requirements for TMDL designations for the Lower Klamath, Shasta, and Lost Rivers. Numerical modeling studies are being designed to study these data, and to develop a tool for managing these load levels.
- Reclamation has funded the Klamath Tribes to monitor long-term nutrient loading in Upper Klamath Lake from tributaries and agricultural drainage. Funds also are used to maintain hatchery-reared endangered suckers for research efforts.
- **Endangered Suckers Studies** - The USGS, in cooperation with Reclamation, is conducting two studies of the endangered suckers in Upper Klamath Lake. In addition to the monitoring program, the USGS has been studying the habitats and habitat utilization of juvenile suckers since 2000. Reclamation, in conjunction with Oregon State University, has been evaluating larval and juvenile sucker habitat use, annual survival of larval and juvenile suckers, and the relative abundance and distribution of suckers in Keno Reservoir.
- **Pilot Oxygenation Project** - Reclamation completed a report in 2003 to determine the feasibility of oxygenating Upper Klamath Lake to reduce the risk of sucker die-offs related to low dissolved oxygen conditions. The report concluded that the proposed project did not demonstrate that it would provide much benefit to water-quality conditions in the lake.
- **Lost River Sucker Fish Studies** - Since 2002, Reclamation has funded studies to determine endangered sucker habitat conditions and presence below Clear Lake and Gerber Reservoir after irrigation deliveries are stopped in the fall. These studies assess habitat availability at different flow conditions.
- **Upper Klamath River Sucker Studies** - Since 2002, Reclamation has also funded studies to determine how project operations affect sucker habitat in the Link River

and Keno Reservoir. The degraded water quality of the Keno Reach has an adverse effect on the endangered Lost River and shortnose suckers, as well as other fish.

- The USGS is researching the effects of decreased water supply to wetland areas in the National Wildlife Refuges and the resulting impacts on waterfowl, bald eagles, and shorebirds. Additionally, the USGS is participating in a cooperative pilot study in California that is evaluating wetland quality and the response to a wetland-cropland rotation cycle. The results will be used to develop computer models to evaluate management options for maintaining ecosystems that will support diverse and productive wetlands in coexistence with sustainable agriculture. In addition to the considerable funds and resources federal agencies continue to inject into ESA consultation activities for the Klamath Project, ESA-related efforts are also underway to develop a Habitat Conservation Plan for lands owned by Simpson Timber and to study green sturgeon in the lower Klamath River.
- In implementing the 2002 Farm Bill, the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Natural Resources Conservation Service conducts a host of conservation and technical assistance programs with farmers throughout the Klamath Basin. These programs include basinwide planning efforts, resource conservation programs, soil surveys, cultural resource assessments, snow surveys and water supply forecasting.

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Memorandum	Administration Efforts in the Klamath Basin - To: Karl Rove - From: Bill Greene	6	08/20/2003	P5;

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Fax Cover Sheet	Letters [with attachments] - To: Susan Ralston	3	04/30/2003	P2; P5; P6/b6;

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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F. Gerald Peters

536137

Gerald "Jerry" Peters Biography

Gerald Peters has been involved in the art business for over thirty years as a dealer, collector, appraiser, and consultant. He is known as one of the foremost and knowledgeable authorities on American nineteenth and early twentieth century works, on the art of the American West, the Taos Society, and Santa Fe Art Colony; on the work of Frederic Remington, Charles Russell, Albert Bierstadt, and Georgia O'Keeffe; and on American Modernism. His solid business dealings and sense of integrity have gained him a worldwide reputation among art galleries, museums, and collectors.

Mr. Peters is an established member of Santa Fe's cultural and business life, an allegiance to New Mexico that began with his enrollment in 1966 at St. John's College, where as an undergraduate he first dabbled in the art business. From modest beginnings, he built his art business and then spread out into other business ventures, such as real estate, banking, and restaurants. With his wife, Katie, a Santa Fe native, he founded the Santa Fe Art Foundation in 1981 to contribute to the community in which they live and to the art community in which they work. The foundation contributes money for art supplies for Santa Fe schools and loans art to schools and other non-profits. A second primary aim of the foundation is helping the needy and hungry in Santa Fe through contributions to such organizations as St. Elizabeth Shelter, the Salvation Army, and St. Vincent Hospital.

Mr. and Mrs. Peters recently made a pledge to donate \$150,000 to the Spanish Colonial Art Society Museum to sponsor the interior portal in honor of artist Frank Applegate and writer Mary Austin. They also donated three important New Mexican artworks: a retablo by santero Bernardo Miera y Pacheco, a nineteenth century crucifix by santero Jose Benito Ortega, and a Spanish colonial silver chalice and paten.

Mr. Peters has also served on or currently serves on several boards; the Federal Reserve Small Business Advisory Board, Century Bank Board of Directors, Bank of Santa Fe Board of Directors, Millicent Rogers Museum Board of Directors, Colby College Museum of Art Board of Directors, Independent Association of Colleges Board as a representative of St. John's College, Wheelwright Museum Board of Directors, St. John's College Board of Directors and Santa Fe Prep Board of Directors. He is also a founding member and board member of Rancho del Oso Pardo, a land preservation project located at the headwaters of the Chama River. Furthermore, Mr. Peters has received honorable awards from St. John's College and the Salvation Army.

The current Santa Fe gallery is a museum-quality 44,000 square foot pueblo style building, with 8,500 square feet of exhibition space, which opened in August 1998. There is a bookstore, featuring a fine selection of in-print and out-of-print art books, an excellent inventory of artists' monographs and catalogues, and Gerald Peters Gallery publications – the fruits of the gallery's ambitious program of exhibition and scholarly research. Also in the gallery are a full-scale photography studio and a library. The stepped-back exterior levels, landscaped sidewalk, sculpture garden, and hand-cut stone wall acknowledge the region's heritage, and the gallery has become a Santa Fe landmark art destination.

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Email	New American Citizenship Initiative... - To: Karl Rove - From: Peter Wehner	2	04/29/2003	P5; P6/b6;

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Memorandum	New American Citizenship Initiative [with attachments] - To: Pete Wehner - From: Jeff Bell	10	04/23/2003	P5;

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Ralston, Susan B.

536137

From: Wilkinson, Mr James [wilkinjr@centcom.mil]
Sent: Monday, June 23, 2003 4:32 PM
To: Ralston, Susan B.; Hernandez, Israel
Subject: Foreign Affairs Article for Karl

Susan and Israel - hope you are doing well...below is an article from the new edition of Foreign Affairs that I thought you both and Karl would find interesting...lays out the construct of the war and gives some interesting historical perspective...

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Foreign Affairs

July 2003 - August 2003

SECTION: ESSAY; Pg. 41

LENGTH: 6887 words

HEADLINE: The New American Way of War

BYLINE: Max Boot

BODY:

The New American Way of War

Max Boot

WAGING MODERN WAR

"The American way of war." That phrase -- popularized by the military historian Russell Weigley in his 1973 book -- has come to refer to a grinding strategy of attrition: the strategy employed by Ulysses S. Grant to destroy Robert E. Lee's army in 1864-65, by John J. Pershing to wear down the German army in 1918, and by the U.S. Army Air Force to pulverize all the major cities of Germany and Japan in 1944-45. In this view, the Civil War, World War I, and World War II were won not by tactical or strategic brilliance but by the sheer weight of numbers -- the awesome destructive power that only a fully mobilized and highly industrialized democracy can bring to bear. In all these conflicts, U.S. armies composed of citizen-soldiers suffered and inflicted massive casualties.

Much the same methods characterized the conflicts in Korea and Vietnam, though with decreasing levels of success; the former being a costly draw, the latter a bloody failure. The first Gulf War was much more successful, but in many ways, it still fit the traditional, firepower-intensive mode: more than five weeks of relentless bombing was followed by a massive armored onslaught. Although the "left hook" that swept around Iraqi forces entrenched in Kuwait showed some operational flair, it was hardly a gamble -- the eight-division allied force was so heavy that it simply crushed everything in its path.

As with all generalizations, this view of the American way of war has always needed some qualification. There have always been some generals, such as Stonewall Jackson and George S. Patton, who favored dazzling maneuvers over costly frontal assaults. And there have been

many "small wars" in America's past that were carried out in a far more modest manner. But as a description of the main U.S. approach to major conflicts, the American way of war has stood the test of time.

Its time is now past, however. Spurred by dramatic advances in information technology, the U.S. military has adopted a new style of warfare that eschews the bloody slogging matches of old. It seeks a quick victory with minimal casualties on both sides. Its hallmarks are speed, maneuver, flexibility, and surprise. It is heavily reliant upon precision firepower, special forces, and psychological operations. And it strives to integrate naval, air, and land power into a seamless whole. This approach was put powerfully on display in the recent invasion of Iraq, and its implications for the future of American war fighting are profound.

TRANSFORMERS

This new American way of war has been a long time in the making; its roots trace back to defense reforms of the 1980s. In recent years its most high-profile advocate has been Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Around the Pentagon, his mantra of "transformation" has become a bit of a joke -- a buzzword that is applied to just about any weapons system or program championed by any of the services. (The army claimed that its canceled Crusader heavy howitzer was, you guessed it, "transformational.") But when Rumsfeld and his senior aides, such as Stephen Cambone and Dov Zakheim, talk about "transformation," they are referring to much more than a change of weapons systems. They are referring to a change of mindset that will allow the military to harness the technological advances of the information age to gain a qualitative advantage over any potential foe.

The transformation of the American military was showcased in Afghanistan in 2001. Instead of blundering into terrain that had swallowed up past invading armies, the United States chose to fight with a handful of special operations forces and massive amounts of precision-guided munitions. This skillful application of American power allowed the Northern Alliance, which had been stalemated for years, to topple the Taliban in just two months. Although generally successful, the Afghan war also showed the limitations of not using enough ground forces. Osama bin Laden and other top terrorists managed to escape during the battle of Tora Bora, and even after a new government was established in Kabul, warlords were left in control of much of the countryside.

The second Gulf War has proved to be more impressive than the Afghan war because it was a truly combined-arms operation. An examination of the conflict shows the potential of the new American way of war and offers some lessons for the future.

Coalition forces in the second Gulf War were less than half the size of those deployed in the first one. Yet they achieved a much more ambitious goal -- occupying all of Iraq, rather than just kicking the Iraqi army out of Kuwait -- in almost half the time, with one-third the casualties, and at one-fourth the cost of the first war. Many will argue, in retrospect, that Saddam Hussein's forces were not all that formidable to begin with, and there is no doubt a great deal of truth in this. But they were capable enough when they fought the Iranian army to a draw in the 1980s and put down Kurdish and Shi'ite insurgencies in the 1990s. And, on paper at least, the Baathist regime's military enjoyed a big numerical advantage over U.S. and British forces. Although the Iraqi army was much degraded from its pre-1991 heyday, it still deployed more than 450,000 troops, including paramilitary units, the Republican Guard, and the Special Republican Guard, whose loyalty had been repeatedly demonstrated. Traditionally, war colleges have taught that to be sure of success, an attacking force must have a 3 to 1 advantage -- a ratio that goes up to 6 to 1 in difficult terrain such as urban areas. Far from having a 3 to 1 advantage in Iraq, coalition ground forces (which never numbered more than 100,000) faced a 3 to 1 or 4 to 1 disadvantage.

That the United States and its allies won anyway -- and won so quickly -- must rank as one

of the signal achievements in military history. Previously, the gold standard of operational excellence had been the German blitzkrieg through the Low Countries and France in 1940. The Germans managed to conquer France, the Netherlands, and Belgium in just 44 days, at a cost of "only" 27,000 dead soldiers. The United States and Britain took just 26 days to conquer Iraq (a country 80 percent of the size of France), at a cost of 161 dead, making fabled generals such as Erwin Rommel and Heinz Guderian seem positively incompetent by comparison.

This spectacular success was not achieved easily, however. It required overcoming the traditional mentality of some active and retired officers who sniped relentlessly at Rumsfeld right up until the giant statue of Saddam fell in Baghdad's Firdos Square on April 9, 2003. Winning the war in Iraq first required rooting out the old American way of war from its Washington redoubts.

FIRST STRIKE

The battle over how to take Baghdad reached full intensity in 2002. General **Tommy Franks**, a stolid artillery officer who ran the Central Command, initially proposed sending a large force, akin to that used in Desert Storm, and paving their way with a two-week air campaign. Secretary Rumsfeld and his advisers wanted to build on the lessons of Afghanistan by sending a much smaller force and starting air and ground operations simultaneously. In typical Washington fashion, a compromise was reached, calling for about 300,000 personnel. But by the time the war started on March 19, 2003, the force deployed was closer to Rumsfeld's "transformational" model than to the traditional heavy force advocated by army planners. Fewer than 100,000 allied ground troops entered Iraq. The bulk of the combat punch was provided by the Third Infantry Division (ID), which had about 200 M1A1 Abrams tanks and 250 M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, and the First Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), which had about 120 Abrams tanks. These forces were supplemented by the British First Armored Division, the 11th Aviation Regiment, the 101st Airborne Division, and a brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division.

The invasion force was lighter than expected because Turkey refused to let the Fourth Infantry Division land on its soil. Franks had insisted on keeping the Fourth ID's equipment anchored off Turkey until the last minute, in part because there simply was not enough dock space to unload in Kuwait. The division was not redirected to Kuwait until after the war had started, and it never deployed in time for the fighting. It is not clear why Franks did not wait for the Fourth ID to start the war. One possible explanation is that he wanted to use the division as a feint, figuring that the Iraqis would not expect the invasion to start until it had landed. Another likely explanation is that he did not want to delay the start of the war until mid-April, when the weather in the Persian Gulf region heats up and makes operations in chemical warfare suits difficult. Whatever the case, Franks' willingness to start the war without overwhelming ground forces showed that he was far bolder than his more flamboyant predecessor, "Stormin' Norman" Schwarzkopf.

The improvisation extended to the start of the war. President Bush's 48-hour ultimatum to Saddam expired on March 19. The war plan called for giving special operations forces a couple of days to work quietly in Iraq before bombing started on March 21. A ground invasion was to come nine hours later. That schedule was thrown out the window when the CIA discovered the location where Saddam and his sons were believed to be meeting on March 19. After several hours of deliberation at the White House, President Bush made the decision to launch an air strike in an attempt to decapitate the Baathist regime. Saddam's alleged meeting place was struck by 40 Tomahawk cruise missiles and several satellite-guided bombs dropped by two F-117a Stealth fighters. The strike failed to kill Saddam, perhaps because the deliberations dragged on so long, but it was a gamble well worth taking.

With the first air strikes moved up, General Franks made a hurried decision on Thursday,

March 20, to move up the ground assault as well. He had received intelligence that some oil wells in the giant Rumaila fields were on fire. Determined to prevent the oil field destruction that had occurred in the last Gulf War, he ordered the First MEF to advance into Iraq ahead of schedule -- and without a massive air bombardment beforehand. There had been some "shaping" of the battlefield prior to the start of ground operations by allied aircraft that were ostensibly enforcing "no-fly" zones, but ordering the ground assault on March 20 was a gutsy call that no doubt caught the Iraqis by surprise.

Even before U.S. and British marines successfully occupied the Rumaila oil fields, allied commandos -- not only American but also British, Polish, and Australian units -- had gone to work. They had been operating in Iraq for several months, focusing especially on the search for weapons of mass destruction and missile launcher sites in western Iraq. It was from there that Saddam had fired Scuds against Israel, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia during the first Gulf War. The commandos' stealthy assault precluded similar dangers this time around.

Fifteen hours after the start of the ground war, the coalition began its full-scale air assault on Baghdad. Despite all the hype about "shock and awe," the initial bombardment was very restrained. In addition to hitting the usual targets -- air defenses and command-and-control facilities -- allied commanders seemed to take special glee in bombing Baath Party headquarters and Saddam's palaces. They had apparently hoped that the regime would collapse at the first whiff of gunpowder, leaving its infrastructure intact. That overly optimistic expectation was dashed when allied ground forces ran into stiffer-than-expected resistance in southern Iraq.

FROM BASRA TO BAGHDAD

Coalition commanders had anticipated that Basra, a heavily Shi'ite city that had rebelled against Saddam in 1991, would rise up this time as well. Yet no such rebellion was forthcoming, in part because Basra's citizens did not want to risk being slaughtered by Baathist security forces, as they had been in 1991. Following the first Gulf War, Saddam had formed the paramilitary Fedayeen to stiffen resistance and prevent any further revolts. Their cruel efficiency ensured that there were no massive uprisings or defections from the Iraqi armed forces in the early days of the second Gulf War.

The coalition's response to this setback was to loosely cordon off Basra. The British First Armored Division would spend the next three weeks patiently chipping away at Iraqi defenses, all the while being careful to avoid the kind of street fighting that Saddam clearly hoped to trigger. Leaving the British behind, the rest of the coalition forces raced north toward Baghdad along two parallel axes. The Third ID took to the largely empty deserts west of the Euphrates River. The First MEF advanced to its right, along the heavily populated east bank of the Euphrates. The initial speed of the advance was breathtaking, with the Third ID sprinting some 200 miles in three days -- far faster than its predecessor, the 24th ID, had traveled during the first Gulf War.

This bold dash toward the enemy capital left the U.S. lines of communication temporarily exposed. In normal army doctrine, an armored cavalry regiment would have been deployed to secure the flanks, but Franks relied on airpower alone. The price of this gamble was revealed when the Fedayeen and other Iraqi security forces began attacking supply convoys. Things quickly turned ugly. On Sunday, March 23, a convoy of the 507th Maintenance Company was ambushed in Nasiriyah, and 12 soldiers were captured or killed. The next day, more than 30 AH-64D Apache Longbows tried to attack Republican Guard positions south of Karbala -- only to run into a wall of small-arms fire that downed one helicopter and damaged the rest. This was a humiliating setback for the most advanced attack helicopters in the world. To top things off, on March 24, much of southern Iraq was enveloped in a blinding sandstorm. Helicopters could not fly and supply convoys had to be delayed, leaving some forward units perilously short on food and other necessities.

Senior commanders made a decision to slow down temporarily the advance to allow their forces to get rested, regrouped, and resupplied -- and to secure rear areas. The 101st Airborne, which initially had been slated to lead the charge into Baghdad, was instead used to secure Najaf, Hillah, Karbala, and other towns along the route. The marines undertook a week of hard street fighting to clear out Nasiriyah. One brigade of the Third ID -- a third of its strength -- was sent back to secure lines of communication.

On March 27, Lieutenant General William Wallace, commander of the army's V Corps, which was in charge of all army units in Iraq, said in an interview that "the enemy we're fighting is a bit different than the one we war-gamed against." Unfortunately, when The Washington Post reported his comment the next morning, it dropped "a bit," giving the impression that U.S. forces had suffered a serious setback. (The New York Times rendered the quote accurately in one story but flubbed it in another.) A media frenzy ensued, with numerous stories suggesting that the offensive was bogged down and that the war could last months and result in thousands of casualties. Leading the charge was a platoon of retired generals who suggested that Rumsfeld had placed the invasion in jeopardy by not sending enough troops.

This criticism vastly exaggerated the difficulties encountered by U.S. forces. The Fedayeen turned out to be more of a nuisance than a serious military menace. Many of their attacks were reckless to the point of being suicidal. They would charge m1a1 Abrams tanks and m2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles in pickup trucks mounted with machine guns. Sometimes the tanks would not even bother to open fire; they would simply roll over the attacking vehicles. The "dead-enders" died by the thousands; few U.S. troops were killed.

Although this fighting was going on in full view of the world's press, an even more critical aspect of the campaign was taking place outside the glare of television cameras: navy, air force, and marine aircraft, along with army helicopters, artillery, and rockets, were pounding Republican Guard divisions dug in south of Baghdad. Some of their fire was directed by aerial surveillance, some by special operations forces on the ground. The assault took an especially devastating toll on the Iraqis during the heavy sandstorm, when they mistakenly believed they could move around freely and instead became easy targets for precision-guided munitions.

On March 29, the most important meeting of the war was convened at Camp David. In a teleconference, the administration's "war cabinet" considered whether to stop the advance and wait for reinforcements, as many armchair strategists were suggesting. President Bush wisely rejected this advice and directed that the focus be kept on Baghdad.

Senior ground commanders wanted to wait to advance until the Republican Guard divisions south of Baghdad were judged to be at least half strength. It took only a few days for intelligence officers to report that the Medina Division was just 20 percent effective, and the other units were not far behind. On the morning of April 1, the army and the marines began their final dash for Baghdad. U.S. soldiers were surprised to find that the supposedly formidable Republican Guard put up almost no resistance. The guard divisions had all but ceased to exist as coherent fighting forces. Those not killed simply threw off their uniforms and ran away.

The only remaining question was how much of a fight the coalition would face in Baghdad. Right up until the last moment, a chorus of gloomy commentators warned that the United States risked another Stalingrad. That was apparently Saddam's expectation too. U.S. intelligence believes he distributed copies of the movie Black Hawk Down to give his commanders hints on what to do.

U.S. forces approached the capital with caution, but they became progressively bolder as

their probing attacks revealed the weakness of Iraqi defenses. On April 3, the Third ID's Seventh Cavalry Regiment seized Saddam International Airport, on the outskirts of the capital. Two days later, an armored column of the Third ID's Second Brigade knifed into the center of the city, drawing heavy fire and killing perhaps a thousand enemy fighters while losing only one soldier. A heavy firefight on April 7 allowed the Second Brigade to secure three key highway junctions leading into Baghdad, which U.S. troops called Objectives Larry, Curly, and Moe. Seeing that the defense of Baghdad was crumbling, U.S. commanders ordered a final push, with the Third ID charging in from the west and the First Marine Division from the east. On April 9, the giant statue of Saddam fell in the heart of Baghdad, signaling the regime's demise.

Mopping up operations in the north took a few more days. A conventional northern front had never really developed. The U.S. presence was limited to a couple of thousand light infantrymen from the 173rd Airborne Brigade and a few hundred U.S. special forces working with the Kurdish Pesh Merga. In a reprise of Afghanistan, this force, backed up by substantial airpower, routed the Ansar al Islam terrorist group out of northern Iraq and took the key northern cities of Mosul and Kirkuk. The occupation of the entire country was completed on April 14, when marines rolled into Saddam's hometown of Tikrit. The hard task of "nation building" lay ahead, but the bulk of the military campaign was over.

HOW THE WAR WAS WON

This three-week campaign will be studied and debated by historians and military analysts for years to come, but even at this early stage, it is possible to point to a number of factors that led to a relatively easy U.S. victory. The most obvious point, of course, is the ineptitude of the Iraqi defense. Saddam had to fight with a force degraded by years of sanctions; his army was ill trained and ill equipped. Although they had a few new gadgets, such as Russian-made Kornet antitank missiles and devices that jammed Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite signals, on the whole their equipment was woefully out of date. There was little chance the Iraqi forces could stand toe-to-toe with the mighty U.S. war machine -- and Saddam knew it. His strategy was designed to make the best of a bad hand. The Iraqis planned to fall back into the cities and utilize guerrilla warfare to drive up American and civilian casualties to the point where, they hoped, domestic and international pressure would force Washington to come to the bargaining table. This was a shrewd plan similar to that used by the Chechens to bog down Russian invaders on two occasions. But in Iraq it was undone by poor execution.

Time after time, Iraqi forces missed opportunities to make life more difficult for the invading army. They did not blow up dams and bridges, utilize chemical weapons, or barricade Baghdad. Why they did none of this remains a mystery. It is possible that Iraqi troops simply did not want to fight very hard for Saddam. But although Iraqi bumbling and low morale provide part of the answer, American prowess must not be overlooked.

Coalition forces, led by the United States, severely disrupted Iraqi command-and-control systems and moved much faster than Iraqi forces could handle. In military parlance, the United States got inside the Iraqis' "decision cycle." This task was facilitated by the fact that Saddam ran a highly centralized regime. Commanders were afraid to relay negative news to Baghdad for fear of incurring the wrath of Saddam or his homicidal sons. And once they were cut off from the center, commanders in the field were afraid to exercise their own initiative for the same reason. Saddam had actually set up systems to ensure that his army commanders could not coordinate closely, for fear that they would plot against him. Thus the Iraqi armed forces were organized on opposite principles from those of the United States, namely decentralization and joint operations. It was the difference in mindsets, as much as anything else, that allowed U.S. forces always to stay several steps ahead of their adversaries.

Whereas the Iraqi military was built on the old Soviet model, the U.S. armed forces specialize

in what the Pentagon calls "network-centric warfare." This approach means taking advantage of information technology to radically enhance the effectiveness of "c4isr" -- command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

The U.S. military operates a bewildering array of sensors to cut through the fog of war. Just consider the lineup of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVS) that operated over Iraq, none of which was available in 1991. At the highest altitude, around 60,000 feet, a RQ-4A Global Hawk provided U.S. commanders with a kaleidoscopic view of the Iraqi battlefield. Lower down, at 15,000-25,000 feet, flew RQ-1B Predators, some of them armed with Hellfire antitank missiles. (Both Global Hawks and Predators can stay on station for more than 24 hours at a stretch.) Beneath them, buzzing just above the battlefield, were smaller, tactical UAVS, such as the army's Hunter and the marines' Dragon Eye, which resembles a model airplane. Then there were all the manned surveillance airplanes: the high-flying U-2, with its synthetic aperture radar; the e-8 Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), which uses ground-mapping radar to monitor the battlefield; the E-3 AWACS, which coordinates air operations; and the RC-135 Rivet Joint, which intercepts enemy communications. All the information they provide is complemented by reports from ground units, which are equipped with GPS, satellite telephones, and wireless Internet devices that allow them to feed their coordinates to headquarters constantly.

In the first Gulf War, commanders took reports by radio and scribbled down troop positions with grease pencils on a map. Now, troop deployments are displayed on digital screens, with friendly forces shown in blue and the enemy in red. In the most advanced U.S. division, the Fourth ID, this wireless Internet system, known as Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below, is installed on nearly every vehicle. But even units such as the Third ID, which have not yet received Force XXI, are far more networked than their predecessors were a decade ago. This advancement cuts down, even if it does not eliminate, "friendly fire" accidents and gives U.S. commanders much better knowledge of the battlefield than their enemies possess. To give an indication of how blinded the Iraqis were, at one point an Iraqi major general tried to escape Baghdad -- and drove straight into a marine checkpoint that he did not know was there. He was killed in a hail of gunfire.

Once enemy forces are located, either through eyes in the sky or boots on the ground, they can be hit faster than ever before. Coordination among the services has improved even since Afghanistan, when the army and the air force traded recriminations about failures of close air support during Operation Anaconda in March 2002. And it is vastly better than it was during the first Gulf War, when three days could elapse between identifying and hitting a target. Then, air tasking orders had to be flown to aircraft carriers. Now those interactions are performed via high-speed satellite and radio relays. In one notable instance, only 45 minutes elapsed on April 7 between the time an intelligence asset detected Saddam meeting with top commanders in Baghdad and the time a B-1B bomber dropped four 2,000-pound satellite-guided bombs on the restaurant.

The precision of U.S. airpower is by now well known and almost taken for granted, but it continues to improve. In the first Gulf War only 9 percent of munitions were precision-guided. In the most recent conflict, that figure soared to 70 percent. Much of this increase was due to the deployment in the late 1990s of Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMS), a cheap (\$20,000) kit that can turn dumb bombs into satellite-guided smart bombs. Aside from their price tag, JDAMS enjoy other important advantages over the laser-guided smart bombs used in the first Gulf War: They can operate in all weather conditions and at all altitudes. The use of JDAMS has made it possible to turn even high-flying bombers such as the B-1, B-2, and B-52 into close air support platforms. Previously, they would have been judged too imprecise for use close to friendly troops or in urban areas. No longer.

Paradoxically, increasing precision makes U.S. firepower both more effective and less destructive. Because U.S. bombs can hit within a meter or two of their aim point, they can

carry a lighter load of explosives. U.S. war planners tried hard to minimize collateral damage by employing the smallest possible munitions to get the job done, on occasion going so far as to drop bombs filled with nothing but concrete. Saddam's regime sought to take advantage of U.S. sensitivities by locating military installations among schools, hospitals, and mosques. But even with such dire provocations, U.S. forces still took great care to spare civilians. The U.S. air campaign never deliberately targeted water and power facilities in Baghdad, as had happened during the first Gulf War. (Electrical power failed anyway on April 4 for reasons that remain mysterious.) Ground forces also did their best to avoid killing civilians, even though Saddam's thugs used human shields in blatant violation of the laws of war. Even though U.S. Army doctrine favors nighttime operations, the 101st Airborne Division operated mainly during the daytime -- because, as one of its brigade commanders put it, "You can much more easily discern civilians during the daytime." No one knows how many civilians were killed in the second Gulf War, but even Saddam's regime, which had an obvious interest in exaggerating the figures, claimed the total was no more than 1,254 as of April 3 -- a remarkably low number considering the savagery of the fighting.

A large part of the reason why U.S. forces wanted to limit civilian casualties was that they were fighting a battle for hearts and minds -- primarily in Iraq but also in the rest of the world. As part of this campaign, a massive propaganda blitz preceded the start of ground operations. U.S. forces used leaflets, radio broadcasts, faxes, e-mails, and other means to urge Iraqi troops not to fight. This campaign did not prevent all resistance, obviously, but it contributed to the decision of most regular army units to stay out of the fray.

Saddam waged his own psychological operations campaign. In an attempt to rally international public opinion against the war and to keep his own people fighting, his TV station broadcast nonstop pictures of U.S. prisoners of war and of Iraqi civilians supposedly killed by coalition air strikes. U.S. forces were surprisingly slow to target Iraqi TV transmitters, and even when a Predator took out a satellite dish with its Hellfire missile on March 25, the Baathists managed to keep broadcasting for a time with redundant systems. Gradually, however, Iraqi propaganda became too far divorced from reality to be effective. Information Minister Muhammad Saeed al-Sahhaf became a global joke as he kept proclaiming that coalition troops were nowhere near Baghdad -- even as they were just a few miles away.

The United States waged a much smarter information war, the centerpiece of which was the program of "embedding" reporters among coalition units. This move succeeded in bridging the chasm of distrust between the media and the military. Indeed, before long reporters were referring to U.S. forces as "we" rather than "they" ("Lester, we're moving out now"). The embedded reporters presented a convincing picture of the professionalism, heroism, and restraint of U.S. and British soldiers. This may not have won over the Arab world, where the media focused almost exclusively on alleged American atrocities, but it did help to sway many Westerners who had been skeptical of the war. As the war's success became evident, support surged in public opinion polls across Europe, America, Australia, and Canada.

Psychological operations are the responsibility of the Special Operations Command. The commandos also handled a number of other missions, from securing western Iraq, to leading Kurdish resistance in the north, to hunting down leadership targets in Baghdad, contributing greatly to the final outcome. In the first Gulf War, Schwarzkopf was wary of the "snake eaters" and used them sparingly. In the second Gulf War, Franks made better use of them, and they delivered outstanding results as "force multipliers."

Although special operations forces are the best of the best, U.S. troops as a whole displayed remarkable skills in Iraq. They were able to fight effectively for long stretches at a time, react quickly to events, and avoid most of the traps the Iraqis had laid for them. The little-heralded logisticians deserve special praise for keeping so many fast-moving troops so well supplied.

Rumsfeld and Franks tried to sell the story that everything went "according to plan." It did not, but the true genius of U.S. forces was their ability to improvise on the spot rather than stick to a rigid blueprint. The troops' fighting edge, honed by realistic training programs, and nonstop overseas operations since the end of the Cold War, allowed coalition forces to fully leverage the benefits of superior technology.

FIGHTING THE NEXT WAR

What lessons does the second Gulf War offer about the future shape of the U.S. military? Although the increased potency of airpower was clearly on display -- it took six weeks to destroy the Republican Guard in 1991 and just a week this time around -- the air force still has not realized the dreams of Giulio Douhet, Billy Mitchell, and other early advocates of airpower, who claimed that aerial bombardment could win wars by itself. Nato tried that approach in Kosovo in 1999, and it was not stunningly successful: 11 weeks of bombing left most of the Serbian army intact. Slobodan Milosevic eventually sued for peace, in large part because he was abandoned by Russia and feared that he might face a ground invasion, but it is doubtful that he would have capitulated if the allied goal had been to liberate the entire country rather than just one province. Four days of air raids against Iraq in December 1988 - - Operation Desert Fox -- achieved even less. Nor did Saddam's regime crumble during the first few days of the more recent bombing of Baghdad; he was neither shocked nor awed by the initial onslaught. The problem is that airpower's edge can be blunted by dispersing and concealing defensive forces; it takes ground forces to root out hidden troops. Airpower by itself is also incapable of preventing Scud launchings or oil-field destruction, both of which were precluded in the second Gulf War through early ground action by conventional and commando forces.

But if the new American way of war cannot obviate the need for "ground pounders," it can make them more lethal, thereby reducing the need for numbers. As the conflict in Iraq repeatedly demonstrated, a good deal of the firepower that once could be delivered only by tanks and howitzers can now come from the air.

This could leave the future of armored forces in some doubt. It should not. The heavy units proved their worth in Iraq. There was no replay of Black Hawk Down largely because U.S. forces fighting in Iraqi cities had armor, and those who fought in Mogadishu in 1993 did not. Having these armored beasts at their disposal allowed U.S. forces in Iraq to advance at a fast clip, with great confidence that they could handle anything thrown their way. Only three Abrams tanks were disabled, and all their crew members survived.

The problem with armored forces is that they are hard to deploy and hard to supply. (The Abrams tank weighs 70 tons and gets half a mile per gallon of fuel.) The experience of the Fourth ID, which never got into the fight, shows just how formidable these challenges can be. Army old-timers who argued for more heavy forces ignored the difficulties of funneling them through Kuwait's single port and keeping them supplied over hundreds of miles. To address this problem, the army is equipping six brigades with the Stryker, a wheeled fighting vehicle that is much lighter, and hence more easily deployable, than an Abrams tank. But the lightness comes with a price: the Stryker's armor cannot stop anything heavier than a .50 caliber bullet. The Stryker should be fine for peacekeeping, but for high-intensity combat the army needs to hold on to its armored forces, though possibly not as many as it currently deploys.

It may make sense to transform some heavy armored units into lighter, more deployable formations. It makes no sense to reduce the size of the army as whole, an idea that Rumsfeld once toyed with. The army has already shrunk from 18 active-duty divisions in 1990 to 10 today -- a force that is not adequate for all its responsibilities, which include deployments in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo, Sinai, South Korea, and now Iraq. The army is overstretched and having to lean more heavily on the reserves and the National Guard for

vital functions such as policing and civil affairs. These part-time soldiers are not happy about becoming full-timers. The marines should pick up some of the slack by shouldering occupation duties in Iraq and elsewhere. But the active-duty army still needs to be increased in size. Airpower, no matter how awesome, cannot police newly liberated countries -- or build democratic governments.

The army needs to tackle the task of "imperial" policing -- not a popular duty, but one that is as vital to safeguarding U.S. interests in the long run as are the more conventional war-fighting skills on display during the second Gulf War. The Army War College's decision to shut down its Peacekeeping Institute is not a good sign; it means that the army still wants to avoid focusing on noncombat missions. The army brass should realize that battlefield victories in places like Afghanistan and Iraq can easily be squandered if they do not do enough to win the peace.

The air force has taken a starring role in recent years primarily through bombing missions in support of ground forces. This has been a bit of culture shock for a service that has traditionally favored either air-to-air engagements or "strategic" bombing. "Tactical" bombing is derided as "tank plinking." This is an old story going all the way back to World War II, when the only way that Eisenhower could be sure of getting adequate air support for D-Day was to gain operational control of the tactical air forces; left to their own devices, air force generals would have allocated all their aircraft for bombing German cities. The air force has done a great deal to overcome this mindset in recent years, but traces of it still linger.

The air force has only 60 B-1B bombers (and only 36 of them are combat-ready) and 21 B-2 bombers (16 combat-ready), forcing it to continue relying on 76 aging B-52HS (44 combat-ready) and on short-range, low-capacity fighter/bombers such as the F-15 and the F-16. The last B-52 was built in 1962, and they are scheduled to stay in service past 2040. Yet the air force has no immediate plans to acquire more bombers, and it is anxious to retire the slow-flying A-10 Warthog, which is designed expressly for ground support and which proved its worth again in Iraq. Its big acquisitions projects are the F/A-22 Raptor and, in conjunction with the navy and the marines, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter -- both short-range aircraft with limited bomb capacity, which makes them dependent on forward bases that may not always be available. Building one new fighter makes sense, but two seems excessive, given that in Iraq, as in just about every conflict since Vietnam, the air force's mission was ground attack.

Congress should repeal the absurd law that prevents the army, with some minor exceptions, from fielding any fixed-wing aviation of its own. If the air force does not want the A-10, let the army take it over to supplement its helicopters, the vulnerability of which to ground fire and plain old mechanical malfunctions was once again demonstrated in Iraq.

Just as the air force is slowly weaning itself from the excitement of air-to-air engagements, so the navy is learning to live in a world in which ship-to-ship battles are increasingly rare. Like that of the air force, the primary function of the navy these days is support of ground operations. Roughly half the coalition aircraft in the second Gulf War came from five navy carriers positioned in the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. Yet the navy's most capable ground-attack aircraft, the A-6 Intruder, which delivered more ordnance during Vietnam than the B-52, was mothballed after the first Gulf War. The navy is forced to rely on F-14s and F-18s, which have short ranges and limited bomb capacity. The navy, too, needs to concentrate more on ground support -- a mission that marine aviators, who also operate off carriers, specialize in.

These are only a few examples of how the military must continue the transformation process after the second Gulf War. More surveillance platforms, such as the JSTARS and the Global Hawk, are needed, as well as more bandwidth to allow all these systems to communicate with one another. U.S. forces used 30 times more bandwidth in Operation Iraqi Freedom than in Desert Storm, and the need for speed will only keep growing. Satisfying this need, and

many others, will be expensive. Even though the defense budget is starting to grow again, it is still inadequate to address all of the military's deficiencies after the procurement holiday of the 1990s. A transformational military will actually cost more than the old force, but the result will be worth it, since it will allow the U.S. military to continue winning wars at a small cost in lives.

Beyond purely technical considerations, there are also important personnel issues. The services have made great strides in working together, but they need to do more to make their systems and mindsets interoperable. The military, which often succumbs to excessive caution in peacetime, also needs to encourage the spirit of innovation and audacity on display on the Iraqi battlefield. These are both high priorities for Rumsfeld, who is pushing an ambitious package of personnel reforms that is sure to be resisted by the Pentagon bureaucracy.

Transformation is by no means finished -- nor will it ever be. It is an ongoing process. But the victory in Iraq shows that the military is making impressive progress toward making the American way of war both more effective and more humane.

Max Boot is Olin Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power*.

LOAD-DATE: June 5, 2003

Goergen, Barbara J.

536137

From: Goldman, Adam B.
Sent: Monday, June 23, 2003 5:10 PM
To: Goergen, Barbara J.
Cc: Ralston, Susan B.; Hernandez, Israel; Westine, Lezlee J.; Troy, Tevi
Subject: 3 articles in the Jewish AP

There are 3 articles in the Jewish AP (JTA) I think Karl may want to see. The second one is a pretty good hit piece on me.

They are all located at: http://jta.org/page_Jewish_News_Washington.asp

Bush courts Jewish voters, not groups

http://jta.org/page_view_story.asp?intarticleid=12916&intcategoryid=3

When President Bush sat down to dinner with about 120 Jews at the White House recently, many familiar faces in the organized American Jewish community ate at home. As he seeks support and votes from American Jews, Bush has made inroads in different ways than many previous presidents.

Groups: 'Gatekeeper' at fault


http://jta.org/page_view_story.asp?intarticleid=12915&intcategoryid=3

Some Jewish leaders complain that their relations with the Bush White House have been politicized more than during previous administrations. The decisions of Adam Goldman, who serves as the main conduit between the White House and the Jewish community, are the problem, according to some groups that feel ignored.


Key is delicacy, groups say

http://jta.org/page_view_story.asp?intarticleid=12914&intcategoryid=3

Some groups, like the American Jewish Committee and the Orthodox Union, have received more attention from the Bush White House than from previous administrations. Jewish leaders who have received increased access say their success has come from a mix of good policy and good politics.



WASHINGTON

 Print This Story

BUSH & THE JEWS

As Bush seeks Jewish voters, traditional groups feel ignored

By Matthew E. Berger

WASHINGTON, June 23 (JTA) — When President Bush sat down to dinner with about 120 Jews at the White House recently, many familiar faces in the organized American Jewish community ate at home.

Instead of Jewish organizational leaders, the guest list for the dinner, which honored the opening of an Anne Frank exhibit at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, included Jewish friends of the president, political supporters, rabbis and Jewish White House staffers.

Just two leaders of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations were chosen to represent the entire organized Jewish world.

The White House's handpicked representation of the Jewish community was the latest in a number of events since Bush came to office two and a half years ago that have ruffled the feathers of American Jewish leaders.

Bush is seeking American Jewish support this summer for two very different agenda items — to find a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and to win re-election for another four years in office.

But in seeking that support, some Jewish leaders say, this White House has sidestepped the traditionally liberal Jewish organizations because of frequent scuffles over domestic policy issues.

Instead, the administration has focused its efforts on ingratiating itself with more conservative Jewish leaders inside and outside the major policy groups, and on direct appeals to Jewish voters.

Public gestures, such as the June 11 White House dinner and Bush's recent visit to the Auschwitz concentration camp, are seen as examples of such appeals. Instead of reaching out to the Jewish leadership, Bush used the Holocaust museum dinner to ingratiate himself with individual rabbis and Jewish leaders who support his Middle East policy and with potential donors, while sidelining those who have voiced opposition to some of his priorities.

Some Jewish leaders say the administration's courting of the Jewish community is similar to Bush's efforts to win black and Latino votes with strong stances on charitable choice and the nomination of minority judges. The difference, they say, is that the appeals to the Jewish community have also been attempts to circumvent the communal Jewish leadership.

The White House liaison to the Jewish community, Adam Goldman, and others at the White House did not respond to requests for on-the-record interviews.

White House officials privately defend their record, saying the Jewish community has been treated fairly and that inroads were made to most, if not all, Jewish organizations.

Logistical reasons have caused some Jewish leaders to be shut out of meetings or events, they say.

Some analysts have, for years, predicted a rightward shift in the Jewish vote, but the White House believes that the Jewish vote is now truly in play, and that they can win over a substantial percentage of the American Jewish community in the 2004 election.

Bush received about 19 percent of the Jewish vote in the 2000 presidential election.

Administration officials and their supporters argue that American Jews across the political spectrum, even those who oppose some of Bush's domestic policy positions, are likely to support the president — both politically and financially — because of his strong actions against terrorism and on behalf of Israel.

In courting Jewish support, the White House has actively searched for like-minded Jews and has fostered a strong relationship with them, while keeping out of the West Wing many of the more familiar representatives of the Jewish community that have been close to previous Republican administrations.

The irony of the situation, some Jewish organizational professionals say, is that Bush now finds it hard to garner full support for the "road map" peace plan among his natural allies, such as politically conservative and Orthodox Jewish groups, which tend to be more hawkish.

Now, leaders of more liberal Jewish groups — whom Bush has largely ignored — are the ones speaking out in favor of the U.S.-backed plan, which calls on Israel to make concessions for peace.

Many veteran leaders of the organized Jewish community say they have endured difficult years under the Bush White House.

Washington representatives of several mainstream Jewish organizations, all speaking on condition of anonymity, say they have experienced unprecedented intimidation and resistance to their concerns.

They complain of being left out of meetings with other religious leaders, having their calls go unreturned and being told that administration officials are unavailable to speak to them.

Several Jewish officials said that when they requested speakers, they were asked how many press releases they had issued recently praising the administration.

Of course, it's hardly a new development that "who's in and who's out" changes with the occupant of the White House.

The Clinton White House also had its favorite Jewish groups, sparking occasional gripes among the Orthodox and politically conservative groups that disagreed with much of Clinton's agenda.

With the Oslo peace process dominating much of the Clinton administration's

foreign policy agenda, those groups that did not wholeheartedly embrace the process, including the Conference of Presidents, felt slighted.

Still, veterans of the Washington scene say Jewish organizational leaders still knew they would be called on when the White House wanted to sound out the Jewish community.

The shift under Bush is not merely partisan, but represents a different approach to engaging the Jewish community, they say.

"It's been more political: We do for you, you do for us," one veteran Jewish official said. "They were making it clear that there is a price to be paid and a reward to be received."

Even leaders from Jewish groups that have been favored by the Bush White House — such as the American Jewish Committee, which Bush addressed in 2001 — say this administration differs from its predecessors, and that, for some groups, an understanding of how to play the new political game has helped them.

"This administration really does insist on a certain code of behavior," said Jason Isaacson, director of government and international affairs for the AJCommittee. "If you sneak up on them and you are unfair or unbalanced in your criticism of them, they take offense."

Theories abound as to the rationale behind the Bush administration's approach.

Some say it's because Goldman, who is expected to leave for the private sector sometime this summer, has been zealously partisan. Goldman's job at the Office of Public Liaison is overseen by Karl Rove, Bush's main political adviser.

Others suggest it's part of a strategy to circumvent the organized Jewish community, which tends to have more liberal professional leaders, and let the administration's actions on issues like the Middle East speak for themselves.

David Frum, a former Bush administration staffer, said the new dynamic between the White House and the Jewish leadership is part of a movement away from the Democrats who lead most Jewish groups and toward the general Jewish population, which he believes is more supportive of Bush's policies.

"It's perfectly reasonable that an administration, when dealing with a community, would tend to deal with those more sympathetic to it," Frum said.

Many Jewish officials acknowledge that the Jewish groups can be a difficult lot to handle, with outspoken views, a traditionally Democratic constituency and many demands.

Still, many feel they haven't been given an adequate seat at the table.

"We're looking to hear from them directly at meetings and conferences," one Jewish official said of the White House. "We're looking to get our questions answered."

Jewish organizations realize that an audience with the president is unlikely to change White House policy. But the officials want to feel that they are being consulted and are part of the process, as they did under previous administrations.

They say the problem started before Bush was even inaugurated, when Rabbi Daniel Lapin, a Seattle-area Orthodox rabbi, and conservative thinker Murray Friedman were the only Jewish officials invited to a meeting of religious leaders to discuss the president-elect's plan for faith-based initiatives.

The cold shoulder has continued to the present, they say, with several Jewish leaders complaining that they were left out of a March meeting with Bush's national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, on the road map.

Ironically, one Jewish leader said, many of the groups that would have supported the plan unconditionally were not invited.

"They treasure loyalty over and above everything," a Jewish leader said of the current administration. "They feel that because we weren't with them on everything, they weren't going to bother."

This stance has placed Orthodox groups, such as the Orthodox Union and Agudath Israel of America, on the list of preferred Jewish voices. Also commonly welcomed are the American Israel Public Affairs Committee and the Conference of Presidents, neither of which delves into domestic policy issues.

In contrast, many other Jewish groups have been vocal about their dissatisfaction with Bush's faith-based initiatives plan — which allows government funding for sectarian social welfare projects — as well as his support for school vouchers and his war on terror, which they feel has eroded civil liberties.

Marshall Breger, a liaison to the Jewish community in the Reagan White House, says the Bush administration is "cherry picking" allies from among Jewish groups.

"If you're at odds with the administration on so many issues, from A to Z, there is less to talk to you about," said Breger, now a professor at the Catholic University School of Law. "I find it almost a kind of unnatural complaint."

Matthew Brooks, executive director of the Republican Jewish Coalition, says almost all Jewish groups have had opportunities to meet with the president and other senior administration officials since Bush came to office. "I vehemently and fundamentally disagree with the notion" that some have been shut out, Brooks said. "They have opened up the White House to the entire Jewish community."

Bush supporters speak of a deliberate plan to vary the voices the president hears, which they say is consistent with his outreach to other minority groups.


"He is trying to reach out, as he is in everything he's doing, to a broader cross-section of the Jewish community," said Fred Zeidman, a Bush friend from Texas whom the president appointed as chairman of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Council, which oversees the Washington museum.

As the 2004 presidential election campaign heats up, outreach to Jews is expected to increase, since Jewish voters can be a pivotal group even though Jews make up only about 2 percent of the American population.

Republican circles believe Bush's handling of the war on terrorism and the Middle East — from Iraq to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict — will be rewarded with fund-raising dollars and perhaps the largest percentage of the Jewish vote a Republican presidential candidate has ever seen.

"It would be a shocking display of ingratitude if American Jews were not to support this president, after all he has done against terrorism that chooses Jews worldwide as its first victims," Frum said.

Frum says Republicans will continue making that case to American Jewish voters directly, driving home the notion that Bush is working for them. Popular support among American Jews, he hopes, may even push community leaders to rethink their political opinions — bringing them closer to those of the administration.

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Email	Gregg Easterbrook on EPA Report - To: Karl Rove - From: Peter Wehner	1	06/29/2003	P5; P6/b6;

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536138 [2]

FRC ID:

9721

OA Num.:

10745

NARA Num.:

10803

FOIA ID and Segment:

2015-0037-F

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Email	Gallup Party Splits - To: Karl Rove - From: Lauren Willson	1	09/22/2003	PRM;

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Email	Party Splits - To: Karl Rove - From: Lauren Willson	1	09/22/2003	PRM;

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Email	Fw: Follow Up - To: Susan Ralston - From: Karl Rove	2	06/30/2003	PRM;

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FORM	SUBJECT/TITLE	PAGES	DATE	RESTRICTION(S)
Email	Bush Accomplishments - To: Karl Rove - From: Peter Wehner	2	06/29/2003	P5;

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Draft	War on Terrorism	2	N.D.	P5;

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