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Joint Campaign Plan Camp David Briefing

12 June 2006

This briefing is classified
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Derived from: Multiple sources
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22 April 2006 MNF Cdr's Conf

Itizam Mushtarak - United Commitment


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The Campaign





Situation

Baghdad


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- Al Qaida continuing efforts to foment civil war; Baghdad is their focus.
- Illegal Armed Groups continue to conduct kidnappings and murders; Baghdad is their focus.
- There is increasing violence fueled by Iran; Sadr confrontation looming.
- The fundamental conflict in Iraq is between and among its ethnic and sectarian groups over the distribution of power.
- Ineffective government plus Samarra bombing and aftermath have created a more complex security environment.
- The Government of National Unity is stronger however the pressures of on-going sectarian violence, lagging basic needs, and weak economic development will make it harder for the new government to demonstrate substantial progress.
- The Sunni population is currently participating in the political process and may be recalculating their alternatives with respect to the insurgency.
- New government will likely exercise their sovereignty more and press for "Way Ahead" on coalition presence and detainees.
- Army development on track; police development progressing, but police loyalty questionable in some areas.
- Completion of political process and recent operations have positioned us for decisive action over the next year.

Evolving Security Environment



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Strategy

The US Mission and Coalition Forces and the sovereign GOI will pursue an integrated civil-military strategy that seeks to progressively improve the capabilities of Iraqi institutions: to enhance unity; to improve security and to build prosperity.

This strategy is shaped by a central tenet: enduring strategic success in Iraq will be achieved by Iraqis. Our approach will increasingly place the GOI and its institutions in the lead across all lines of operation, first with Coalition monitoring and support, and then with progressively less support until they can govern effectively without our assistance.

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Joint Mission Statement

The US Mission and Coalition Forces will, in support of the Government of Iraq, contribute to an environment where Iraqis can develop representative and effective institutions capable of meeting the needs of the Iraqi people, creating the conditions for the Rule of Law, defeating the terrorists and irreconcilable insurgents, bringing other insurgents into the political process, reducing sectarian tensions and militias and denying Iraq as a safe haven for terror.



Evolution of the Mission

August 2004 Campaign Plan

MNF-I...conducts full spectrum counter-insurgency operations to isolate and neutralize former regime extremists and foreign terrorists...

April 2005 Campaign Action Plan

MNF-I...progressively transitions the counterinsurgency campaign to the ITG and Iraqi Security Forces...

May 2006 Joint Campaign Plan

USEMB and MNF-I...contribute to an environment where Iraqis can develop representative and effective institutions...

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Concept of Operations - Phases

Phase One – Stabilization (2006 to Early/Mid 2007)

- **Objective:** Stabilize the security situation to the point where political and economic development can take place without disruption.
- **Endstate:** Iraqi Army in the lead, AQI defeated and conditions set for the transfer of security responsibilities to capable Iraqi civil authorities. Ministerial and provincial development continuing.

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Phase Two – Restoration of Civil Authority (Early/Mid 2007 to Early/Mid 2008)


- **Objective:** Place capable Iraqi civil authorities in the lead for security throughout Iraq. Build accountable local and national governments underpinned by a robust rule of law program.
- **Endstate:** Insurgency neutralized, Iraqi civil authorities in the lead, GOI ministries and institutions operating with minimum Coalition support and more normal security relationships established.

Phase Three – Support to Self-Reliance (Early/Mid 2008 Thru 2009)

- **Objective:** Achieve Iraqi self-reliance, across all lines of operation.
- **Endstate:** Achievement of our campaign endstate: Iraq at peace with its neighbors and an ally in the War on Terror, with a representative government that respects the human rights of all Iraqis, and security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order and to deny Iraq as a safe haven for terrorists.



Lines of Operation



Strategic Effects:

Terrorists defeated and
Insurgents neutralized

Representative government
that promotes national unity

Strengthened rule of law

Meet basic needs

Economic reforms spur
development

International support for Iraq
increased

Enhanced understanding of
Coalition efforts

Wedge driven

Capable ISF assume security
lead

End-State:

Iraq at peace with its
neighbors and an ally
in the War on Terror,
with a representative
government that
respects the human
rights of all Iraqis, and
security forces
sufficient to maintain
domestic order and to
deny Iraq as a safe
haven for terrorists.



Priority Objectives for Next 12 Months

- **Priority objectives will be delivered in the next twelve months:**
 - **A government of national unity composed of representatives of all major political forces and led by professional and competent ministers. (EMB)**
 - **Adoption by the government of an ambitious program of reforms and action to improve the lives of the Iraqi people. (EMB)**
 - **An accommodation between the Iraqi government and the insurgents that results in an improving security situation. (EMB/MNF)**
 - **Baghdad and nine key cities secure. (MNF/EMB)**
 - **A governmental strategy to diminish the influence of Illegal Armed Groups. (MNF/EMB)**
 - **Iraqi government and security forces taking responsibility for security in an increasing number of areas. Police at a level where they can continue assuming responsibilities for domestic order. (MNF)**
 - **An increased capacity of Iraqi ministries and provincial governments to deliver good governance and basic services. (EMB/MNF)**
 - **An increased capacity by the Iraqi government to establish law and order through the rule of law and effective institutions. Detainee operations transferred to Iraqi control. (EMB/MNF)**
 - **Increased economic growth led by the private sector. (EMB)**
 - **Containment and roll back of Iran's influence in Iraq and a strategic change in Syria's behavior. (EMB/MNF)**
 - **A significant increase in the political and economic support from the international community and regional neighbors. (EMB)**
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Risks

- **Loss of Coalition will.**
 - **Collapse of National Unity Government.**
 - **Sectarian violence leading to sustained sectarian conflict.**
 - **Fracture of Iraqi Security Forces along sectarian lines.**
 - **Illegal Armed Groups remain unchecked by government and fuel sectarian conflict.**
 - **Sunni population decides to support AQI out of fear of Iranian influence.**
 - **Rampant corruption and failure of the rule of law.**
 - **Strategic surprise.**
 - **Loss of or diminishing consent for Coalition presence/freedom of action.**
-



June 12-13, 2006



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Classified by Ambassador Khalilzad

E.O. 12958: reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

DECL: 6/12/2016

Overall Strategic Assessment



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By NH NARA, Date 6/21/12

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Political Assessment



Goal: Orderly/rapid transition to new Government and increased capacity to provide essential services to citizens

- Orderly transition resulted in a new Government that includes Sunni Arab, Shia, Kurdish, and Islamist and secular minority members. Built on broad community participation in December 05 election.
- Slow transition reflects continued mistrust among CoR members. Vast majority belong to ethnic or sectarian-based parties. Premature to judge how well members will work together.
- The government faces tough political, security, and services challenges: de-Ba'athification, militias, constitution review, reconciliation.
- Increased capacity needed to provide services.



Political Assessment (cont.)



Goal: Iraqis forge a National Compact for democratic government

- Constitution ratified on October 15 contains the principles required for a true National Compact, particularly a front-loaded amendment process.
- Executive, legislature, and judiciary must adhere to these principles. CoR must pass implementing legislation and meet requirement for Constitution review.

Goal: Active Sunni involvement in Government

- 59 Sunni Arabs in CoR. Dramatic increase over TNA.
- Sunnis also hold VP, DPM, and six ministerial positions.

Goal: Reduce insurgency by drawing off support through broad Sunni participation in political process, while reassuring Shia

- High level of violence, especially in Baghdad. Shift from anti-Coalition to Sunni-Shia sectarian changes context of the question.
- Recent indications of Sunni transition toward accepting CF presence in Iraq. Fear of militias, Shia sectarianism, and Iran are factors.

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Economic Assessment



Goal: Broad-based economic growth and job creation via private sector investment, sound financial policies, and policy reform

- 2006 GDP growth projected at 10.6% for 2006 (IMF) – largely oil based
- Key IMF Stand-By Arrangement in December 2005 – schedule of fuel subsidy reductions on track; supports fiscal responsibility and enhanced financial governance
- Food subsidies for universal welfare system (Public Distribution System) reduced 25% or \$1.0 Bn; further reductions tied to future means testing
- Oil exports probably will meet 2006 budget target (1.62 MBPD minimum at \$46.50), but spending on security needs and social services in 2007 will require careful attention
- Anti-corruption institutions created – penalties not dissuasive; adjudication minimal
- Fuel products and electricity market distortions cause negative impact on economic growth
- No significant GOI action to open or diversify economy taken to date



Economic Challenges for Al-Maliki Government



Near-term reforms necessary for broad-based growth and financial health

- IMF SBA back on track – secure restart of fuel subsidy reductions; exercise fiscal responsibility, particularly regarding excess wages and pensions

- Hydrocarbon Sector
 - Liberalization of fuel imports to meet current shortfalls and break black market in petroleum products
 - Produce hydrocarbon legislation with attention to national unity, revenue flow and investment (open sector to FDI)

- Initiate Measures for Broad-Based Growth
 - Housing initiatives
 - Investment liberalization
 - Agricultural development
 - Privatization



I Services



Goal: GOI able to provide access to basic essential services to the population of Iraq.

- The USG initially set ambitious targets for service delivery based on flawed assumptions.
- Despite challenges, USG programs and projects have created a solid base for essential services improvement.
- 2,700 MW added in electricity; improved capacity to provide water for 3.7 million people and sewerage for 5.1 million; however, distribution networks and systems lag well behind increases in capacity.
- Significant additional funding and planning required in essential service infrastructure to meet basic needs.
- Most donor funds remain un-disbursed, and the Iraqi government lacks resources to allocate and spend reconstruction and capital improvement monies.



MNF-I Security Assessment



Goal: Defeat terrorists and neutralize insurgents; capable Iraqi Security Forces assume lead

- The diversity of violent groups in Iraq has blurred the precision of the term “the insurgency” and has increased the complexity of the security environment.
- We have prevented the resistance from expanding geographically and have set the conditions for including the resistance in the political process. However, we have not reduced the level of attacks or enabled the government to address the underlying causes of the resistance.
- We have been successful in attacking Al Qaida leadership infrastructure and facilitation networks, and we have prevented them from establishing safe haven in Iraq. However, we have not eliminated their ability to carry out high-visibility, mass-casualty attacks.
- Lack of government will has enabled militias to arm, grow in size, influence, and carry out an increased level of murders, executions, and kidnappings. Iraqi-on-Iraqi violence fuels sectarian fears and diminishes confidence in the new Iraqi Government.
- We have built a capable Iraqi Security Force of 266,000 soldiers and policemen and are on track to complete force generation by the end of the year. We have been successful in placing Iraqi Army units in the lead for counterinsurgency (2 divisions, 15 brigades, 62 battalions). Police development lags behind Army development; Ministry of Interior forces suffer from actual and perceived sectarian bias.
- We have been successful in integrating assistance teams into the security ministries, and we have developed close working relationships with ministry personnel. However multiple ministry transitions have slowed development.



International Support



Goal: Increase in international and regional support.

- 49 accredited diplomatic missions. World Bank to open office.
- UN active; greater presence needed for provincial elections and International Compact.
- Arab League and Iraqis discussing reconciliation conference.
- 17 of 18 Paris Club members have signed bilateral agreements totaling \$29B (80% of debt). No performance on Gulf states commitment to restructure \$44-48B debt.
- Only around \$3.5B of \$13.5B pledged by non-U.S. donors at the Madrid Conference disbursed.
- Security is constraint on civilian foreign presence in Iraq.
- Arab neighbor support limited; Iraq reaching out to them.

Goal: Change Syrian behavior. Contain and roll back Iranian influence.

- Some Syrian action to control border. No fundamental change in strategic outlook.
- Iran deliberately undermining our efforts in Iraq.



Assessment Implications



Next steps – Challenges that must be addressed:

- Capacity building
- Reintegration of militias and insurgents
- Reconciliation
- Iranian influence
- Accelerated economic development and international support
- Staffing
- Support for moderate political forces
- Education

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Iraq - Political Process

June 12, 2006

UNCLASSIFIED
Classified by S/I James F. Jeffrey
E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
Declassify on: 13 June 2036

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Authority 2010 - 0690-M #430
By SAH NARA, Date 4/2/2013

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Impact of Political Process on Political Violence

- Need a planned and visible “reconciliation” or “peace” process to lead to one or more events by September or October, to give reconciliation a focal point and intensify politics within insurgent groups and militias (representatives, demands, etc.)
 - Political process is necessary, but not sufficient, to control political violence.
 - Jihadis and militias want to destroy or control process, not join it.
 - Factors in the violence include growing nationalist sentiment, religious motivations (Islamic extremism), ethnic strife and a large number of unemployed young willing to become “piecework insurgents” or criminals.
 - Militias will see their interest affected by a successful political process, some will respond violently
 - Post-Samarra environment is different
 - Militias forced displacement, drawing geographic battle lines more sharply and reducing incentives for inter-sectarian cooperation
 - Sunnis developing neighborhood and village militias – attacking Shia and provoking cycle of retribution
-



Effectiveness of Political Strategy

- Situation in Iraq is not improving (more violence, little Iraqi perception of governance or economic improvement)
- Need demonstration of US will to succeed – encourages GoI to accept responsibility, reiterates its legitimacy/sovereignty
- Prepare US public for long struggle – changing Iraqi governance culture requires a generation



Need to Focus on Few Key “Launches”

Must Push Iraqis Hard

- Security and Reconciliation:
 - Security Component Critical: Political process cannot succeed without results on:
 - Baghdad
 - Anbar
 - Basra
 - JAM
 - Effective/Trusted ISF: Police...or Army?
 - Review options to crush AQIZ
 - Warn Iranians, then begin actions
 - To Generate Results (moving from growing strength), include :
 - Amnesty (in reserve)
 - Detainees
 - Deba'athification
 - Other tough constitutional/political issues Kirkuk, Regions (but note oil reform as possible alternative way to address these)
 - Militia Integration
 - Bring Saddam trial to politically helpful end
 - Most Importantly: Integrated Political Program to win over at least part of the insurgency



Need to Focus on Few Key “Launches” (cont.)

- National Renewal
 - Oil Plan
 - Budget
 - Infrastructure Security (note link to energy reform—“Prohibition” analogy)
 - Anti-corruption
 - Emergency Economic Resources
 - Rule of Law
- International Compact (Iraqis can combine Launches 2 and 3)

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Building a Moderate Center

- **The Problem:** Westernized political leaders/movements have little demonstrated appeal in Iraq
- **The Process:** Strategic engagement with religious parties, e.g., IIP and SCIRI
- **The Substance:** Craft the security bargain that can unite moderate Shia, moderate Sunni, and Kurds
- Requires exchange of US/Iraqi commitments:
 - Acceptance of religious parties' leading role/no imposition of sharia, prosecution of forceful imposition
 - Security cooperation/action against terrorists and militias
 - Pressure on Arab States to increase support/outreach to neighboring states to make support more acceptable
- Interest in maintaining a stable system and a close relationship with us would moderate behavior of Islamists, creating space for secular politics as a by-product.

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